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COMMENTS
A WOMB OF MY OwN:
A MORAL EVALUATION OF OHIO'S
TREATMENT OF PREGNANT PATIENTS
WITH LIVING WILLS
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1991, Ohio enacted legislation' enabling competent adults
to execute a "declaration,"2 a document commonly referred to as a
living will or a type of advance directive.3 A declaration states an
individual's wishes for the use, continuation, withholding or with-
drawal of life-sustaining treatment in the case of that person's
subsequent inability to authorize or to decline such treatment. Dec-
larations obtain their utility and legitimacy from the assumption
that the preferred manner of decision-making for all patients, in-
cluding those lacking rational capacity, is that which reflects as
closely as possible the patient's own wishes.4
By providing a legislatively-defined mechanism by which
1. Modified Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 1337.11-.17 (Anderson 1993), §§ 2133.01-.15 (Anderson Supp. 1992) [hereinafter the
Act].
2. See id. § 2133.01(F).
3. A living will, for which a form exists in Ohio, is a commonly used term for the
declaration itself. The term "advance directive" may also include the appointment of a
durable power of attorney for health care. See generally ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO
DIE §§ 10.1-2 (1989). Ohio law regulates the appointment of a durable power of attorney
for health care under OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1337.11-.17 (Anderson 1993).
4. See MEISEL, supra note 3, at § 10.1-2. See also In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1249
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (accepting substituted judgment, under which the court determines as best
it can what choice the individual, if competent, would make, as the best procedure to
follow to determine an incompetent pregnant patient's wishes regarding health care as "it
most clearly respects the right of the patient to bodily integrity").
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individuals, "declarants," 5 can effectuate their health care decisions
after they are unable to make or communicate an informed
choice,6 the Act generally advances the ethical principles of indi-
vidual autonomy, self-determination, and bodily integrity.' Numer-
ous provisions in the Act further protect the declarant's autonomy
by attempting to ensure that the decision regarding the termination
of life-sustaining treatment was informed, deliberate, and carefully
considered, and that the declaration accurately depicts the
declarant's wishes.'
Recognizing that a declaration constitutes the best evidence of
a patient's wishes, the Act supports the implementation of all valid
declarations, with one exception. Amidst the substantive and proce-
dural safeguards against misunderstanding or contravening a
declarant's wishes, the Act contains the following:
Life-sustaining treatment shall not be withheld or with-
drawn from a declarant pursuant to a declaration if she is
pregnant and if the withholding or withdrawal of the treat-
ment would terminate the pregnancy, unless the declarant's
attending physician and one other physician who has exam-
ined the declarant determine, to a reasonable degree of
medical certainty and in accordance with reasonable medi-
cal standards, that the fetus would not be born alive.9
Even if a pregnant woman specifically declined life-sustaining
treatment in her living will, the clause mandates such treatment
until the fetus can be brought to a live birth.
This Comment addresses the ethical implications of Ohio's
5. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.01(E) (Anderson Supp. 1992).
6. See William M. Todd, Directing Health-Care Choices, OHIO LAW., Sept.-Oct. 1991,
at 10 (offering one drafter's summary of Ohio's living will law).
7. Commentators have criticized the extent to which living wills actually advance an
incompetent patient's right of self-determination, as they reflect only the individual's past
preferences and values as a once-competent adult and fail to incorporate the now-incom-
petent individual's interests. See Rebecca Dresser, Relitigating Life and Death, 51 OHIO
ST. L.J. 425, 431 (1990) (arguing for a modified objective standard to honor the incompe-
tent patient's present interests). She does not dispute, however, that living wills enable
individuals to control their futures.
8. Substantively, under Ohio law a living will becomes operative only in the very
narrow circumstances when a terminal or persistently vegetative patient who would other-
wise die of natural causes is being maintained on artificial means of life support. Proce-
durally, the statute contains extremely specific directions to indicate treatment choices so
that the declaration is valid under the law. See OHto REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2133.01-.03
(Anderson Supp. 1992).
9. Id. § 2133.06(B) [hereinafter the pregnancy clause].
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pregnancy clause. As background, Part II summarizes the legal
principles implicated in the dilemma presented by pregnant
declarants. Part III articulates an analytic test proposed by a bio-
medical ethicist"° to determine if Ohio's treatment of pregnant
declarants is morally justified and thereby embodies sensible state
policy. Part IV applies the proposed test. As the analysis exposes
inconsistent and unjustified moral judgments implicit in the policy
toward the pregnant woman, this Comment concludes that the au-
tomatic refusal to implement her living will is unacceptable state
policy. Part V suggests balancing the state's interest in the fetus'
potential life more evenly against the numerous and complex moral
responsibilities implicated when a pregnant patient's living will
directs the termination of life-sustaining treatment.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The circumstances in which Ohio's pregnancy clause operates
create a confounding legal problem. The declarant's pregnancy
introduces the interests of an other into a legislative scheme de-
signed to protect the declarant's autonomy in decision making.
Independently of the statute, the declarant's end-of-life decisions
reflect her deepest, most profound beliefs and emotions about her
own existence. Yet, the interests of that other, or the state's asser-
tion of those interests, cannot be considered separately from the
declarant's because the two are, at the time, inextricably merged.
In addition to their physical interrelatedness, the mother's role in
creating the fetus precludes independent consideration of their legal
interests. This section briefly presents the legal principles which
converge in the case of a pregnant declarant.
A. The Right to Refuse Treatment
The right of individuals to self-determination in health care
finds its basis in common law. This country has long protected
individuals' rights of autonomy and freedom from state intervention
in decision-making. 1 Historically, invasions of one's physical be-
ing were particularly egregious.
10. See infra notes 58-87 and accompanying text.
11. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(arguing that defendant's objections to evidence obtained by wire-tapping ought to be
sustained). Justice Brandeis observed that the "right to be left alone-the most comprehen-
sive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men," encompassed individuals'
thoughts, beliefs, emotions and sensations. Id.
19941
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No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded
by the common law, than the right of every individual to
the possession and control of his own person, free from all
restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and un-
questionable authority of law . . . 'The right to one's per-
son may be said to be a right of complete immunity: to be
let alone." 2
Even in the context of medical therapy, touching an individual
without her consent constitutes an unwarranted invasion of her
right to bodily integrity, a battery. 3 The doctrine of informed
consent developed to ensure that an individual's consent was
"true": that the individual exercised her choice free from imposition
and with knowledge of available options and risks.'4 As a logical
corollary of the doctrine of informed consent, competent patients
possess the right not to consent, that is, the right to refuse treat-
ment.'
5
Several state courts have held the common law right of bodily
self-determination provided a sufficient ground to refuse life-sus-
taining treatment. 6 However, the United States Supreme Court's
landmark decision of Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health7 raised the right of self-determination to a federal consti-
tutional "liberty interest" guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 8 Inferring federal constitutional protection of that right from
12. Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (refusing to require plaintiff
in tort action to undergo surgical examination to verify injuries (quoting THOMAS M.
COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (1880))).
13. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (developing the
doctrine of informed consent, a legal and ethical principle encompassing an individual's
understanding of the risks and benefits accompanying a particular medical treatment, and
the individual's voluntary acceptance of the intervention).
14. Id. at 780-83.
15. See Cruzan v. Director,, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990).
16. See James M. Jordan Ill, Note, Incubating for the State: The Precarious Autonomy
of Persistently Vegetative and Brain-Dead Pregnant Women, 22 GA. L. REv. 1103, 1105
(1988) (citing cases). Other courts have found the right encompassed under state constitu-
tions. Id.
17. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
18. Id. at 278. Several state courts, including Ohio, have found the right to decline
life-sustaining treatment within the fundamental constitutional right of privacy. See, e.g.,
Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1138 (1986); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d
647, 664 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical
Ctr., 426 N.E.2d 809, 814 (Ohio C.P., Summit County 1980). See also Jordan, supra note
16, at 1105 (citing cases). However, the Supreme Court expressly eschewed a privacy
analysis in Cruzan, establishing the right to refuse treatment as a liberty interest. See
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prior decisions, 9 the Court affirmed the right of a competent per-
son to refuse life-sustaining treatment, including nutrition and hy-
dration."
The Court's characterization of the right to refuse life-sustain-
ing treatment as a constitutionally protected liberty interest, rather
than as a fundamental right, disappointed some right-to-die pro-
ponents.2' Weighing the liberty interest against "relevant state in-
terests,"'  the Court held that Missouri could properly require
clear and convincing evidence of the incompetent patient's wishes
before treatment was discontinued.' Thus the Court refused to
overturn the state supreme court's decision that testimony at trial
regarding Nancy Cruzan's wishes did not meet the clear and con-
vincing evidentiary standard.24
Though the majority declined to define the right to refuse life-
sustaining treatment as fundamental,' Cruzan essentially promoted
a patient's right of self-determination. The Court asserted the state
had "more particular interests"'  in imposing the evidentiary bur-
den than its interest in the preservation of human life.
The choice between life and death is a deeply personal
decision of obvious and overwhelming finality. We believe
Missouri may legitimately seek to safeguard the personal
element of this choice through the imposition of heightened
evidentiary requirements.
In the Court's view, the state's requirement protected the
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279 n.7.
19. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279'
20. l at 278-79.
21. See Leon R. Kass, Is There a Right to Die?, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Jan.-Feb. 1993,
at 34, 40 (describing the response of right-to-die proponents).
22. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982)).
23. Id. at 280.
24. Id. at 285.
25. The dissenting opinion characterized the right of competent individuals to refuse
treatment as fundamental, which obtains the highest constitutional protection, and advocat-
ed extending that right to incompetents as they are no less entitled to due process and
the equal protection of their rights. Id. at 304-09. In a concurring opinion, Justice
O'Connor affirmed the protection afforded competent patients' rights to refuse unwanted
medical treatment, and suggested that the state may have a duty to enforce a surrogate's
decision to protect an incompetent patient's liberty interest as well. Id. at 288. O'Connor's
opinion has been read as raising the right to refuse treatment to a fundamental level. See
Richard E. Shugrue, The Patient Self-Determination Act, 26 CREIGHTON L. REv. 751, 759
(1993).
26. 497 U.S. at 281.
27. Id.
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individual's right to self-determination by ensuring an accurate
understanding of the patient's wishes. The deeply personal and
final nature of a decision to forego life-sustaining treatment may
legitimately warrant a higher evidentiary standard to ward against
misinterpretations of a patient's ambiguous expression. Thus,
Cruzan guarantees an individual's right to effectuate her health care
preferences once those preferences have been expressed in accor-
dance with state standards.
B. The Scope of a Woman's Procreative Autonomy
The Supreme Court has long protected childbearing decisions
from state intrusions. As part of the constitutional right of personal
privacy, decisions in matters of childbearing lie at the "very
heart"'28 of an individual's right to independence in certain kinds
of important decisions.29 Providing a legal construct for the scope
of a pregnant woman's autonomy in her procreative capacity, Roe
v. Wade30 established as fundamental a woman's right to choose
to terminate her pregnancy before fetal viability. Only a compel-
ling state interest advanced by narrowly tailored means may over-
ride the woman's right to choose.3'
In Roe, the Court found two state interests that grow weightier
and eventually become compelling as a woman approaches full
term: "preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant wom-
an,'32  and "protecting the potentiality of human life. 33  The
28. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977) (holding that the deci-
sion whether or not to bear or beget a child was among those protected by the constitu-
tional right to privacy).
29. The Court accords parental decisions regarding their children special protection
from government interference as well. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
(upholding parents' interest in guiding the religious future and education of their children);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (invalidating a state statute requiring
students to attend public rather than private schools as it unreasonably interfered with
parents' liberty in upbringing and educating children under their control); Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (including within "liberty" under the Fourteenth Amendment
the right of an individual to marry, establish a home and bring up children).
30. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973).
31. Id. at 155.
32. Id. at 162. Considering the potential detriment to the health of pregnant women if
abortion were prohibited, the Court enumerated the following factors: the distress of ma-
ternity or of having additional offspring, psychological harm, distress for all concerned
associated with an unwanted child, the problem of bringing a child into a family unable,
psychologically and otherwise, to care for it, and the difficulties and stigma of unwed
motherhood.
33. Id. at 162.
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Court's subsequent decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey'
affirmed viability as the point in the pregnancy when the state's
interests in the fetus' potential life are strong enough to support
restrictions on abortion." At no time in the pregnancy, however,
may the state's abortion regulations endanger the woman's life or
health;36 statutes that require a trade-off between the woman's
health and fetal survival are unconstitutional. 7
In Casey, as in Cruzan, the Court emphasized the special def-
erence a state must accord decisions involving an individual's
definition of her identity.
[A mother's] suffering is too intimate and personal for the
State to insist, without more, upon its own vision of the
woman's role, however dominant that vision has been in
the course of our history and our culture. The destiny of
the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own
conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in
society."
Combined with the force of stare decisis, the personal and spiritual
nature of childbearing decisions convinced the Court to preserve
the woman's right to be free from government interference before
fetal viability.
The state's interest in the fetus' potential life has shaped the
scope of pregnant women's procreative autonomy outside the abor-
tion arena. Courts have ordered pregnant patients to undergo medi-
cal treatment, commonly blood transfusions or cesarean sections, in
order to benefit the fetus. While some courts followed Roe's de-
marcation of viability as the earliest point at which a state may
interfere with a pregnant woman's decisions affecting her fetus,39
others have forced medical treatment upon pregnant patients prior
34. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
35. Id. at 2804.
36. Id.
37. See Thomburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 768-69 (1986) (invalidating certain provisions in Pennsylvania's Abortion Control Act
of 1982); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 397-401 (1979) (invalidating provisions in
Pennsylvania's 1974 Abortion Control Act). See also Deborah K. Rhoden, The Judge in
the Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court-Ordered Cesareans, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1951,
1975-81, 1989-94 (1986) (establishing that neither Samaritan nor abortion law supports the
subordination of the mother's well-being to save an endangered fetus).
38. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807.
39. See, e.g., Taft v. Taft, 446 N.E.2d 395 (Mass. 1983) (declining to order medical
treatment-for patient pregnant with nonviable fetus).
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to fetal viability.' In addition to considering fetal welfare in these
contexts, courts have recognized the state's interest in protecting
dependent third parties from loss of a parent when considering
whether state intervention is justified."
The judicial decisions imposing treatment upon pregnant wom-
en contradict the common law rule which denies the existence of a
duty to rescue. "Courts do not compel one person to permit a
significant intrusion upon his or her bodily integrity for the benefit
of another person's health."42 Affirming this principle even where
denying aid would result in the death of the endangered person, a
Pennsylvania court refused to order one individual, Shimp, to do-
nate bone marrow which was necessary to save the life of his
cousin, McFall.43 While the court characterized Shimp's refusal to
aid his cousin as "morally indefensible," it held that compelling an
individual to submit to a bodily intrusion would "defeat the sancti-
ty of the individual [in violation of] the very essence of our free
society. '
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld this princi-
ple in the context of a mother's duty to her fetus.45 In In re
A.C.,4 the court considered the propriety of an order to perform a
cesarean section on an unconsenting, questionably competent preg-
nant patient to save her viable fetus. The court declined to distin-
guish the case from McFall on the grounds that a woman who
"'has chosen to lend her body to bring [a] child into the world'
has an enhanced duty to assure the welfare of the fetus."'47 Rather,
the fetal case did not support a duty to rescue because "a fetus
cannot have rights in this respect superior to those of a person
who has already been born."4 The maternal-fetal relationship did
not abrogate the mother's right to be free of unwanted bodily
40. See, e.g., In re Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (ordering life-
saving treatment for a pregnant woman with a nonviable fetus).
41. See Rhoden, supra note 37, at 1973 (summarizing decisions incorporating the
state's interest in protecting dependent children).
42. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1243-44 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
43. Shimp v. McFall, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (Allegheny County Ct. 1978).
44. Id. at 91.
45. While the law of rescue contains an exception imposing a duty upon parents to
aid their children, rescues that risk life or limb remain optional. See Rhoden, supra note
37, at 1976-77.
46. In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1235.
47. Id. at 1244 (quoting John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of
Conception, Pregnancy and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REv. 405, 456 (1983)).
48. Id.
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intrusions even where a forced intervention would protect the fetus'
life or health.49
While most of the conflict between the state and a woman's
reproductive autonomy centers on the right not to procreate, a
recent societal phenomenon involves state intervention in a
woman's decision to procreate. In a widely publicized controversy,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey condemned surrogate mother
contracts.50 Labeling such surrogacy arrangements as "potentially
degrading to women,"" the court asserted that the essential evil in
surrogacy arrangements lay in taking advantage of the woman's
need for money, despite the woman's consent to providing the
procreative service. 2 The court also recognized the legitimacy of
state regulations designed to prevent coercion of expectant mothers
with offers of financial inducements to part with their children.53
Ohio courts concur in this view.' These decisions support the
existence of a societal policy against coercion in women's deci-
sions to procreate.
m. A MORAL 'TEST" FOR PUBLIC POLICIES
While pregnancy clauses such as Ohio's have been subjected to
analysis under the law that is,"5 this Comment evaluates Ohio's
treatment of pregnant declarants in terms of the law that ought to
be.57 Thomas H. Murray, Director of the Center for Biomedical
49. Id. at 1252.
50. In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (NJ. 1988) (invalidating a surrogacy contract). In
the particular surrogacy arrangement at issue, a woman agreed to be artificially inseminat-
ed with the semen of another woman's husband for a fee of $10,000, to carry the result-
ing fetus to term, and to surrender the baby after birth to the natural father and his infer-
tile wife.
51. Id. at 1234.
52. Id. at 1249. The court asserted several other policy arguments against surrogacy
arrangements, such as the rights of natural parents compared to adoptive parents, and the
desire to allow both natural parents to raise the child.
53. See id. at 1248 (recognizing the law prohibiting the use of money in adoptions).
54. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Infant Baby Girl Banda, 559 N.E.2d 1373, 1375 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1988) (asserting that the purpose of Ohio's adoption statute is to protect the
mother and her baby from improper financial incentives in the mother's decisions).
55. See also Guido Calabrese, Do We Own Our Own Bodies?, 1 HFALTH MATRIx 5,
9 (1991) (acknowledging society's disapproval of a woman selling her womb in the case
of surrogate motherhood).
56. See, e.g., Elizabeth Carlin Benton, Note, The Constitutionality of Pregnancy Clauses
in Living Will Statutes, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1821 (1990); Jordan, supra note 16, at 1103;
Janice MacAvoy-Snitzer, Note, Pregnancy Clauses in Living Will Statutes, 87 COLUM.
L. REv. 1280 (1987).
57. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv.
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Ethics at Case Western Reserve University School of Medicine, has
articulated an analytic approach to determine if moral judgments
underlying public policies are sensible and thereby provide ade-
quate support for those public policies." By relying on ethical
principles which apply to all individuals by virtue of their
personhood, or their simple existence as human beings, his ap-
proach encourages reasoned discussion of the emotionally and
politically charged policy articulated by the pregnancy clause.
Murray responds to the periodic emergence of medical ethical
issues which implicate a mother's autonomy and the welfare of a
fetus in utero. In the past, Murray has focused on public policies
by which the state intervenes in a pregnant woman's conduct that
threatens nonfatal harm to her fetus." While his analyses do not
specifically address the treatment of pregnant declarants, the preg-
nancy clause dilemma shares the essential feature of all ethical
questions regarding medical interventions designed to aid a fetus.
These cases require "asking how far the state-and physicians as
agents of the state-ought to go in coercively intervening in the
life of a woman in order to benefit her fetus. ' 60
As a first step, Murray inquires whether a fetus obtains the
moral standing inherent to personhood. 6' Addressing only those in-
terventions designed to prevent nonfatal harm to the fetus, Murray
avoids perhaps the most emotional and divisive controversy of this
century, the abortion debate. According to Murray, the primary
ethical concern in nonfatal interventions is the well-being of a fetus
L. REv. 593 (1958) (arguing against the separation of law and morals).
58. See Thomas H. Murray, Moral Obligations to the Not-Yet-Born: The Fetus as
Patient, 14 CLINICS IN PERINATOLOGY 329 (1987) [hereinafter Murray, Moral Obligations];
Thomas H. Murray, Prenatal Drug Exposure: Ethical Issues, THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN
Spring 1991, at 105 [hereinafter Murray, Prenatal Drug Exposure].
59. Murray has discussed the incarceration of pregnant drug addicts, see Murray, Pre-
natal Drug Exposure, supra note 58, at 105, and "Fetal Protection Policies" adopted by
American companies which prohibit pregnant women or potentially pregnant women from
working in toxic environments. See Murray, Moral Obligations, supra note 58, at 329.
60. Murray, Moral Obligations, supra note 58, at 329.
61. Murray's inquiry implicitly assumes that individuals, by virtue of their existences as
human beings, possess fundamental, inalienable rights of freedom and equality, which
support a moral duty to protect these rights. His analyses explicitly explore the scope of
that duty, as it exists from the mother and from society in general.
Under federal law, an individual is not owed the full protection of the state until the
individual is a "person" within the language and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment,
an event which occurs at birth. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1973). However,
Roe establishes that the state incurs a significant duty to protect fetuses as potential per-
sons at the point of viability. Id. at 163.
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that will be brought to a live birth, a "not-yet-born child."'62 As
beneficence toward a not-yet-born child is shared universally, the
moral stature of the fetus with respect to a mother's choice to
abort it is irrelevant in the context of nonfatal harm.'
The fetus' destiny, to become a person in being, also establish-
es the moral irrelevancy of the viability issue for nonfatal harms.6"
"An act resulting in harm to a not-yet-born person, (who will
eventually be a full-fledged person according to everyone's moral
theory) is as great a harm as if it were done later."' The timing
of the particular harm which a medical intervention is designed to
prevent does not affect the moral evaluation of the act which caus-
es the harm.'
Once dissociating his analysis from the abortion controversy,
Murray cautions against oversimplifying the relationship between
the mother and her child-to-be.
Rather than viewing a woman who is pregnant as having
one more relationship with moral import to add to the
others she already has, we tend to treat a pregnant woman
as if the fact that she is pregnant is the only morally im-
portant thing about her. Her pregnancy becomes a trump
card, overwhelming all other moral considerations.
Murray contends the moral life is not so simple. First, an individu-
al exists in a "complex web"68 of morally significant relationships
with many people. A mother's obligation to born or not-yet-born
children may be particularly broad and deep, but it may not over-
whelm all other morally relevant considerations in all circumstanc-
es.
69
Nor is a pregnant mother the only party who influences the
fetus' well-being." Murray points out that the health care system
in this country, which results in many women not receiving ade-
quate prenatal care, may cause more damage to more not-yet-born
•62. Murray, Moral Obligations, supra note 58, at 331. Murray describes such a fetus
as a "not-yet-born child to distinguish it from both the already-born child and from the
fetus who will not be born alive." Id.
63. Murray, Prenatal Drug Exposure, supra note 58, at 106.
64. Murray, Moral Obligations, supra note 58, at 332-33.
65. Id. at 331.
66. Murray, Prenatal Drug Exposure, supra note 58, at 106.
67. Id. at 107.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 107-08; Murray, Moral Obligations, supra note 58, at 334.
70. Murray, Prenatal Drug Exposure, supra note 58, at 107.
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children than any illegal drug.7 Furthermore, moral judgments
behind policies towards fetuses must consider the obligations of
fathers. As many actions a father-to-be takes may affect the fetus'
well-being, Murray asserts that fathers-to-be may be equally or
more at fault than the pregnant woman for not ensuring the fetus'
welfare.72
Second, moral obligations in real-life contexts cannot adequate-
ly be evaluated as all-or-none. 3 Every decision a parent makes
regarding a born child involves a multiplicity of risks and consider-
ations; certain risks are reasonable based on the probability of
harm, its severity, the importance of the purpose for which the risk
is run and the avoidability of the risk.74 The complexity persists
among the decisions of a pregnant woman. Murray admits the
"geography" of pregnancy, the fact of the fetus' physical location
within the woman, broadens the scope of actions potentially affect-
ing the fetus beyond that posed by actions of parents of born chil-
dren.75 He argues, however, that is a difference in number, not in
kind. "Fundamentally, a pregnant woman's moral obligations to her
not-yet-born child are comparable to a parent's obligations to a
born child."'76
Murray applies this principle of moral equivalency to evaluate
the ethical nature of a mother's conduct that affects her fetus, and
thereby the ethical boundary of the state's permissible intervention
in a pregnant woman's behavior to benefit the fetus. Murray notes
the almost universal recognition that a pregnant woman has a mor-
al duty to take reasonable measures to prevent fetal injury.' To
assess the scope of that duty, Murray analogizes a pregnant woman
71. Id.
72. Id. Murray explains that many actions of a father-to-be impact the long-term well-
being of the fetus. Drinking or taking drugs that engender violent behavior or encourage
the pregnant woman to do so, or refusing to pay for or discouraging adequate prenatal
care, incurs moral culpability. See also Hilde L. Nelson, Paternal-Fetal Conflict, HASTINGS
CTR. REP., Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 3 (summarizing studies establishing the deleterious effects
on offspring due to sperm damaged by exposure to toxins).
73. Murray, Moral Obligations, supra note 58, at 334-35.
74. Id. at 336. As a simple example of the multiplicity of moral factors involved in
any parental decision, Murray offers the practice of subjecting a child to a long car ride
to enable visits with grandparents. More complex balancing appears in a parent's morally
justified decision to expose a child to the considerable risks of cytotoxic drugs when the
purpose is the treatment of cancer.
75. Murray, Prenatal Drug Exposure, supra note 58, at 108.
76. Id. at 108-09.
77. Id. at 109.
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and her fetus to a father" and his born child, based on the com-
mon and comparable moral obligations flowing from parent-to-be
to fetus and father to child. Because a fetus cannot have rights
superior to a person in being, he argues that the obligations im-
posed on the father constitute an upper bound on the moral obliga-
tions that may be imposed upon the pregnant woman. Under this
"child-as-maximum" '79 principle, the obligations of the pregnant
woman to ensure the fetus' welfare may equal but not exceed the
father's obligations to a born child.80
Even when the moral comparison suggests that a pregnant
woman's conduct is morally questionable or wrong, state interven-
tion in her decisions is not always morally justified by the state's
interest in protecting children. "We do not ban all conduct we
regard as morally suspect, nor do we compel people to carry out
every moral duty."'" Society grants parents wide latitude in deci-
sions to expose children to risk. 2 Where state intervention in-
volves coercion, bodily invasion, or incarceration, society especially
constrains the state's power to force its views of correct conduct
on individuals. "The moral and other costs of enforcement may
outweigh the good that might be done."'
Protecting children when they are fetuses is especially problem-
atic, according to Murray. When necessary, the state may remove
born children from physical surroundings which endanger them. 5
Not-yet-born children, in contrast, are not so separable. Due to the
geography of pregnancy, Murray warns that "the moral cost of pro-
tecting not-yet-born children can be grave, interfering, perhaps
grossly, with the autonomy of pregnant women."86 The assessment
of the moral costs of a policy consists of moral judgments that can
be tested with the analogy to fathers and children. Constructing a
situation involving a father and his child with similar moral dimen-
sions to the dilemma confronted by pregnant women enables evalu-
78. Murray compares pregnant women to fathers, as opposed to parents in general, to
help remove cultural blinders which might distort society's view of a pregnant woman's
responsibility to her fetus. Murray, Moral Obligations, supra note 58, at 336.
79. Id. at 338.
80. Id.; Murray, Prenatal Drug Exposure, supra note 58, at 109.
81. Murray, Moral Obligations, supra note 58, at 337.
82. Murray, Prenatal Drug Exposure, supra note 58, at 110.
83. Murray, Moral Obligations, supra note 58, at 337.
84. Id.
85. Murray, Prenatal Drug Exposure, supra note 58, at 110.
86. Id.
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ation to see if a parallel policy response is morally justified.'
Murray's inquiry into the extent to which the state, and physi-
cians as agents of the state, ought to intervene coercively in the
life of a woman in order to benefit her fetus emphasizes the com-
plexity and multiplicity of interests in moral decision making.
Attempting to balance among moral considerations, Murray pursues
public policies towards pregnant women which satisfactorily resolve
the conflict these interventions pose between the ethical principles
of beneficence or nonmaleficence toward the fetus, and patient
autonomy for the mother. Employing the analogy to fathers of born
children, Murray's test exposes inconsistencies in the moral judg-
ments society imposes upon pregnant women that weaken the pub-
lic policies based upon those judgments.
IV. ANALYSIS
Murray's moral test challenges the drastic intervention88 re-
quired by pregnancy clause. The forced continuation of life-sustain-
ing treatment for a pregnant declarant in contravention of her ad-
vance directive poses an extremely complex, difficult ethical dilem-
ma. The hopelessness of the pregnant declarant's medical condition,
combined with the potential for life that still exists inside her,
create an emotional vortex in which the interests of the declarant,
the declarant's family, 9 the fetus, the physicians, and the state
intertwine. While factual distinctions between this and contexts
Murray has addressed require some adjustments to his test, his
method of moral analysis exposes inconsistencies inherent in the
policy underlying the pregnancy clause, discrepancies enlarged by
prevailing legal rules. By asserting the primacy of the state's inter-
est in the fetus' potential life over all other significant moral con-
siderations, the mandate to treat the pregnant declarant crosses the
87. Murray acknowledges that public policies must be evaluated by several criteria, in-
cluding their effectiveness, efficiency and proportionality, which includes the consideration
of the moral costs. Id. at 110-11.
88. One might argue that continuing treatment for the pregnant declarant is not an
intervention that compares to, for example, the more blatantly intrusive incarceration of a
pregnant drug addict, or a forced cesarean section to benefit a fetus. The similarity is
clearer when the pregnancy clause forces initiation of life-sustaining treatment, rather than
prohibits its withdrawal. However, the state's exercise of power intrudes upon the pregnant
woman's autonomy and bodily integrity in all of the above contexts.
89. This Comment uses the term "family" to include traditional family members as
well as other friends or care givers important to the declarent and responsible for her
care.
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ethical boundary of permissible state intervention.
In the contexts Murray has addressed involving interventions
designed to prevent nonfatal harm to fetuses, he dissociated his
analysis from the abortion controversy by recognizing the consen-
sus regarding the welfare of not-yet-born children."° The fetus'
viability is irrelevant where the fetus may suffer a nonfatal harm,
for the fetus-as-born child would exhibit the injury as a living
person regardless of the time it suffered the injury.91 In contrast,
the moral evaluation of Ohio's pregnancy clause must address the
fact that terminating life-sustaining treatment for the declarant will
result in the simultaneous death of the developing fetus.
The fact of fetal death catapults the analysis of the pregnancy
clause into the abortion debate. As both abortion and the discon-
tinuation of life-sustaining treatment of a pregnant declarant result
in fetal death, both contexts expose the tension between a woman's
freedom to choose and the state's interest in the existence of the
fetus. Theoretically, the controversy may be bypassed. The
mother's decision to forego life-sustaining treatment does not con-
tain the morally condemnable intent to kill her fetus, even if she
were competent and aware of her pregnancy. When her treatment
ceases, she will die of natural causes, as will her fetus.9' While
the termination of the fetus' potential life magnifies the human
tragedy in such a situation, the mother is no more morally culpable
for the fetus' death than she is for the condition that has devastat-
ed her own existence.
The theoretical distinction between intentionally aborting a fetus
and recognizing that a fetus will expire with the natural death of
the mother may not satisfactorily resolve the debate over whether
to implement a pregnant declarant's living will. The availability of
medical technology that can artificially sustain the life of the moth-
er, and thereby the fetus, creates the need for a more practical
ethic to address the question of the fetus' personhood at the time
the treatment dilemma arises.93 Perceiving the fetus as a person
will influence moral judgments of whether treatment ought to be
imposed upon a pregnant patient against her wishes.
If one believes the fetus obtains no moral standing until it is a
90. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
92. See MacAvoy-Snitzer, supra note 56, at 118.
93. Theoretically, the availability of the technology does not necessitate its use. See
Rhoden, supra note 37, at 1964 (criticizing the "technological imperative").
19941
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
person in being, an act which terminates the fetus' development is
morally inconsequential. However, if one grants the fetus any mor-
al standing while in utero, even if a lesser moral stature than
adults or children, or stature that grows as the fetus develops, an
act which terminates the fetus' development obtains some degree of
moral culpability. Furthermore, one's emotional reactions to the
fetus' development may contribute to the existence and strength of
moral judgments regarding the appropriateness of terminating the
mother's treatment. Unlike in the contexts of nonfatal harm ad-
dressed by Murray, timing seems critical to the moral analysis of
state intervention in a pregnant woman's decision to forego life-
sustaining treatment.
The pregnancy clause comprehends the significance of timing.
As written, the provision presumptively mandates the imposition or
continuation of life-sustaining treatment for a pregnant declarant if
failing to do so would terminate the pregnancy. However, the
provision does not require treatment to continue if two physicians
determine that the fetus "would not be born alive."'  Only under
such circumstances does the state allow considerations beyond its
own interest in the fetus to affect the treatment decision.
Presumably influenced by abortion law, commentators have
interpreted Ohio law to "render a directive invalid for a pregnant
declarant only if the fetus is viable.""5 The definition of "viable"
provided by Ohio case law compares to the language of the preg-
nancy clause; a viable fetus has "reached such a state of develop-
ment that it can live outside the uterus."96 If viability were the
standard intended by the drafters of the pregnancy clause, the stat-
ute would mandate state intervention against terminating the
declarant's treatment after approximately the twenty-fourth week of
pregnancy, when the fetus has approximately a fifty percent chance
94. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.06(B) (Anderson Supp. 1992).
95. See MEISEL, supra note 3, § 11.14 n.60. As Roe and its progeny protect the
woman's right to choose to have an abortion before fetal viability, commentators generally
consider this provision to save Ohio's statute from constitutional challenge. However, ap-
plying abortion law may be inappropriate. Roe allows states to prohibit intentional fetal
destruction after viability, unless continuing the pregnancy threatens the mother's life or
health. "It says nothing about whether the state may require invasive medical procedures
to promote fetal health." Rhoden, supra note 37, at 1953.
96. Peterson v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 197 N.E.2d 194, 196 (Ohio 1964) (holding
that an "unborn viable child capable of life outside its mother's womb" is a person with-
in family compensation clause of automobile liability policy providing death benefits for
persons killed as result of motor vehicle accident).
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of survival on its own.97
Though the law endorses viability as the point in time when a
fetus obtains the rights of personhood, and thus the state's protec-
tion, no moral consensus has been reached.9 However, even as-
suming viability ought to constitute when the state's interest in the
fetus' potential life outweighs the mother's autonomy and bodily
integrity, the pregnancy clause denies the declarant that extent of
protection. Instead of employing the legal term "viability," the
clause refuses to implement the pregnant woman's declaration
unless physicians determine the fetus would not be born alive. The
ambiguous drafting exacerbates the moral problems with the state's
singular promotion of its own interest in protecting the fetus.
While one physician's interpretation of "born alive" might
compare to that under the viability standard, another might consider
a fetus to be born alive if the fetus could be maintained on a
respirator, feeding tubes and incubator with only a ten percent
chance of eventually surviving independently. At a different hospi-
tal, that fetus might have only a five percent chance of survival,
yet physicians there might agree the fetus would be born alive.
The Ohio pregnancy clause subjects the pregnant woman's rights to
such arbitrary factors as the sophistication of her treating hospital
and physicians or the physicians' own biases regarding the fetus'
moral status.
The Ohio statute on vital statistics" suggests a more specific
definition of "born alive," but incorporating the definition into the
pregnancy clause would retract almost entirely.a pregnant woman's
right to autonomy in her end-of-life decision. Ohio law requires
physicians to report as a "live birth" any "product of human con-
ception that after expulsion or extraction [from its mother] breathes
or shows any other evidence of life such as beating of the heart,
pulsation of the umbilical cord, or definite movement of voluntary
muscles. ' '""e In light of this definition, the pregnancy clause may
97. Telephone Interview with Nancy Judge, M.D., an obstetrician/gynecologist specializ-
ing in maternal-fetal medicine at University Hospitals of Cleveland, Ohio (Sept. 30, 1994).
98. The closest consensus may simply be that reasonable minds may disagree over
when the fetus obtains personhood, a problematic conclusion if a sense of moral objec-
tivity is the goal.
99. OHto REv. CODE ANN. § 3705.01(A) (Anderson 1992).
100. Id. Dr. Judge, supra note 97, indicated that the law as she understood it requires
physicians to report as a live birth a delivered fetus that exhibited agonal gasping, the
last breath taken before death. She also reported delivering ectopic pregnancies with heart-
beats, thereby qualifying as live births.
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mandate the disregard of pregnant declarants' living wills as soon
as the collection of fetal cells displays a heartbeat, which occurs at
approximately four to five weeks after conception.'"' Thus the
provision may effectively extinguish a pregnant declarant's right of
self-determination and bodily integrity from the outset of her preg-
nancy, in deference to the state's interest in the fetus' potential
life.
The potential significance of timing in the context of forced
treatment of pregnant declarants does not impair the instructive and
compelling force of Murray's analytical approach. Even if one
concedes the moral wrongness of a pregnant declarant's decision to
forego treatment at any point in her pregnancy, the question re-
mains whether state intervention in her decision is justified."e Ir-
respective of the point in time at which the fetus obtains
personhood, Murray's "child-as-maximum" principle holds that the
obligations of the pregnant woman to ensure the fetus' welfare
may equal but not exceed a father's obligations to a born child. As
exposed by an analogy which presents the father of a born child in
an ethical dilemma similar to that of pregnant declarants, the preg-
nancy clause violates this principle without sufficient justification.
Consider a father of a newborn child. He is currently hospital-
ized, in a terminal or vegetative condition, and supported by ar-
tificial means. 3 Prior to his decline in health, he executed a liv-
ing will in accordance with the specifications of Ohio's living will
101. The heart begins to beat and propel blood through the embryo on approximately
the 22nd day of the pregnancy. WILLIAM LARSEN, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY 153 (1993).
However, current medical technology cannot detect a fetal heart rate until five weeks after
conception. DAVID N. DANFORTH, OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 129 (1994).
Interpreting the "born alive" terminology so as to force treatment upon the mother if
the fetus would be delivered as a live birth under OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3705.01
(Anderson 1992) would clearly violate Roe's prohibition against a state's undue interfer-
ence with a woman's right to choose abortion before fetal viability. Thus, courts would
be unlikely to interpret the pregnancy clause accordingly. Yet physicians seem likely to be
aware of the live birth definition as they are responsible for reporting such vital statistics
to the state. See id. § 3705.09 (requiring filing and registration of birth certificate for
each live birth in the state, with the physician in attendance providing the medical infor-
mation required by the certificate). Even if the drafters of the pregnancy clause intended
to allow pregnant declarants greater autonomy than such a definition would allow, its
language may convince physicians and their counsel to err on the side of legal safety
when treating pregnant declarants.
102. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
103. The author thanks Dr. Murray for his suggestion of the outline of the following
hypothetical situation. Interview with Thomas H. Murray, Ph.D., Director of the Center for
Biomedical Ethics at Case Western Reserve University School of Medicine, Cleveland
Ohio (Sept. 9, 1994).
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law. He now meets the statutory definition of a "qualified pa-
tient""'° so that his physicians and family are prepared to comply
with his advance directive to withdraw all life-sustaining treatment.
Before treatment is withdrawn, physicians discover his newborn
son suffers from a disease treatable only by transplanting several
organs from an acceptable donor. The physicians determine the
father is the only acceptable donor. However, the baby is unable to
accept the organs immediately; physicians cannot attempt a trans-
plant for three to six months, and there is no way to store the
organs outside the father's body. Once the father's organs are used,
physicians could continue to maintain his body as before on life
support, or they could terminate treatment and allow him to die.
Without his father's donations, physicians concur, the baby will
surely die. 5
Although the father cannot alter his living will, would one
judge him as morally wrong if he had included in his living will a
provision specifically denying his newborn the use of his organs?
While some might find the idea of organ donation disquieting or
objectionable for any number of reasons, the moral obligation to
assist one's child is extremely compelling under such circumstanc-
es. Yet, does the state's interest in preserving life justify the impo-
sition of life-sustaining treatment upon the father so that his organs
may be harvested for his newborn child at a later date?
Even if one's response is "yes," the analogy illuminates the
fact that Ohio's living will law does not require a father in such
circumstances to continue treatment so that his body may be used
to save the child."° Yet the statute does force treatment upon a
pregnant woman whose fetus is similarly dependent upon the use
of her body. The inconsistency may reflect, as Murray suggests, a
narrow view of the relationship between a pregnant woman and her
fetus,"W or perhaps some other bias not implicated with fathers of
104. See OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2133.01(Z) (Anderson Supp. 1992).
105. The hypothetical establishes that the unique geography of mother and fetus does
not create a unique physical interrelatedness, although it may make the circumstances
more viscerally disarming. As the fetus has only one available means of sustaining its
life, its physical dependence is not qualitatively different than that of the newborn upon
the father in the hypothetical, or of McFall upon Shimp. See supra notes 43-44 and ac-
companying text. Even if other organ donors exist, they cannot be forced to donate; the
born child relies solely upon the father as a means for continued existence.
106. Again, the living will statute mandates treatment exclusively for pregnant declarants
while supporting the implementation of the declarations of all other qualified patients. See
OHto REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2133.01-.15 (Anderson Supp. 1992).
107. See supra notes 67-76 and accompanying text.
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born children. Arguably, the inconsistency may result from mere
oversight, as the drafters could not possibly consider every circum-
stance which might favor continuing treatment against a declarant's
wishes."t 8 Regardless of the reason for the differential treatment,
the statute imposes a greater obligation on the pregnant declarant
than it does on the father of a born child whose existence depends
upon the appropriation of the father's body.
The discrepancy illuminated by the analogy exposes that the
state ought not to force treatment automatically upon pregnant
declarants in contravention of their advance directives. The circum-
stances in which a pregnant patient's living will becomes operative
create numerous and complex moral responsibilities among the
mother and her fetus, the father, family, and physicians. The state
may legitimately intend to protect the fetus, but the pregnant
declarant's pregnancy, as Murray notes, is not the only morally
important thing about her.' 9 The pregnancy clause wrongly pre-
cludes determining whether any moral considerations override the
state's interest in the fetus' potential life and support the imple-
mentation of the mother's living will.
To the extent the enactment of a living will law reflects
society's commitment to patient autonomy,"' respecting the
mother's declaration constitutes an inherent moral good. The
mother's decision not to be maintained on artificial life support
required her to confront her own mortality, perhaps the most fright-
ening and perplexing concept an individual must face."' As rec-
ognized by the Supreme Court, the "choice between life and death
is a deeply personal decision of obvious and overwhelming finali-
ty.""' 2 Perhaps even more than in a woman's decision to bear or
108. One might argue the impossibility of including prohibitions against terminating
treatment in all circumstances which might justify disregarding any adult's advance direc-
tives. My response would be complete agreement; this impossibility directly exposes the
flaw of the pregnancy clause. The statute isolates the plight of the pregnant declarant,
assuming all other groups of otherwise qualified patients will be treated justly under the
provisions for objection in the event circumstances challenge the guarantee to implement
the patient's living will. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
109. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
111. See ERNEST BECKER, THE DENIAL OF DEATH ix (1973) (exploring the psychologi-
cal effect of the concept of mortality); JAMES P. CARSE, DEATH AND EXISTENCE: A CON-
CEPTUAL HISTORY OF HUMAN MORTALITY 7 (1980) (studying ten major conceptions of
death); Daniel Cappon, The Psychology of Dying, in THE INTERPRETATION OF DEATH 61
(Hendrik M. Ruitenbeek ed., 1984) (studying the fear of death in dying hospital patients).
112. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990). See supra
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abort a child, "her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and
her place in society"'' likely shaped her decision to forego life-
sustaining treatment. The gravity of these considerations makes it
unlikely that she made the choice lightly; the procedural require-
ments of the living will law could only enhance the deliberateness
of her decision."
The pregnancy clause trivializes the significance of the
mother's self-defining and conscientious choice by automatically
overriding it. The moral cost of doing so depends, at least in part,
on whether the mother knew she was pregnant when she executed
her living will. Without this knowledge, her refusal of treatment
was not entirely informed, thus diminishing the moral compulsion
to implement her advance directive as a means of protecting her
autonomy. Yet the pregnancy clause does not recognize any level
of consent by the mother to treatment in light of her pregnan-
cy."'. The mother may have been fully aware of her pregnancy
but have failed to reconsider her living will, or she may have been
unaware of her pregnancy before she became incompetent. In either
of these cases, good moral reasons may support a refusal to imple-
ment her living will. The mandate, however, to ignore the pregnant
declarant's directive is an unnecessary diminution of her
personhood, as the statute already contains mechanisms through
which her family and physicians may object to the discontinuation
of treatment."6
Even assuming the pregnant declarant refused medical treatment
with full knowledge of her pregnancy, the state's interest in pro-
tecting the fetus' potential life does not alone justify intervening in
the patient's decision. Deontologically,"7 the mandatory interven-
note 27 and accompanying text.
113. Planned Parenthood v.- Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2807 (1992). See supra note 38
and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
115. The statute fails to consider any other circumstances of the declarant's pregnancy.
Did she freely consent to sex? To becoming pregnant after intercourse? Even those
staunchly opposed to abortion often concede that abortion may be justified in cases of
rape or incest; the pregnancy clause precludes consideration of any circumstances other
than the fact of pregnancy.
116. Individuals, including family members, may object to the implementation of a
qualified patient's declaration on the grounds that the course of action proposed is not au-
thorized by the declaration, that the declarant did not give informed consent to the de-
cisions within the declaration, or that the declaration does not substantially comply with
the statutory requirements. See OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2133.05 (Anderson Supp. 1992).
Physicians who object to the implementation of a qualified patient's living will may ar-
range for the patient's transfer. Id. § 2133.10.
117. Deontological ethics deny that the moral value of actions is exclusively a function
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tion inflicts a grave moral wrong. Just as neither the law". nor
society"9 requires the father to sacrifice the use of his body, the
pregnant declarant should not be singularly considered the means to
further the state's interest in the potential life of the fetus. The af-
front to her personhood is starkly illuminated by the fact that the
pregnant declarants' bodies are treated with less respect than corps-
es; society refuses to force the donation of organs or tissue from
cadavers to benefit or save the lives of thousands in need of
them. 2 Neither her medical condition nor her pregnancy erodes
her sanctity as an individual.
The state's opposition to coercive influences in women's pro-
creative decision making in other contexts exacerbates the moral
wrongness of its coercive intervention affecting pregnant declarants.
Inconsistently, family law condemns coercion in a woman's use of
her reproductive capacity,' while the pregnancy clause coercive-
ly treats a pregnant declarant as having nothing more. The state
must believe its interest in protecting the fetus justifies the physical
and ideological duress of imposing unwanted treatment upon a
pregnant declarant, whereas the interest of the adoptive parents in a
surrogacy arrangement does not justify coercing the woman with
money. But state intervention under the pregnancy clause seems
immeasurably more coercive, for the pregnant declarant has no way
of voicing her consent even if she were willing to give it. Whatev-
er the extent of the surrogate mother's choice, however imperiled,
involuntary, or coerced is her decision to accept money for the use
and the product of her womb, it is greater than that of the preg-
nant declarant who is forced to undergo unwanted medical treat-
ment to incubate her fetus.
Most would agree that the depth and strength of the maternal-
of the consequences of those actions; the means used to reach a desired end may be so
condemnable that the action is morally unjustifiable. See generally BARRY R. FURROW Er
AL., BIOETuIcs: HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 6-28 (1991) (defining two ethical theo-
ries, utilitarian and Kantian, predominant in current culture).
118. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
119. The McFall court recognized that other societies might require an individual to
sacrifice his body in such a manner. However, the court confirmed that compelling an
individual "to submit to an intrusion of his body would change every concept and princi-
ple upon which our society is founded." McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90, 91 (Al-
legheny County Ct. 1978) (emphasis added).
120. See Lawrence J. Nelson & Nancy Milliken, Compelled Medical Treatment of Preg-
nant Women, 259 J.A.M.A. 1060, 1065 (1988) (arguing that neither the medical profession
nor society should support judicially compelled treatment of pregnant women).
121. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
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fetal relationship proportionately magnifies the declarant's moral
duty to aid her fetus beyond the duty owed by Shimp to McFall,
as a cousin," and beyond the duty of one stranger to anoth-
er." Conceding this judgment, however, does not necessitate the
conclusion that the scope of her duty justifies the state intervention
required by the pregnancy clause. The sanctity of each individual
life supports the position that one being may not be harmed for the
sake of another. Reflecting this principle, the law does not allow
the state to require a trade-off of a mother's health for her fetus'
survival.124 Arguably the physical invasion mandated by the preg-
nancy clause does not expose the mother to risk, due to her ter-
minal or vegetative condition. However, to the extent the living
will law generally recognizes the harm in depriving incompetent
individuals of their rights of self-determination and bodily integrity,
the pregnancy clause forces an otherwise impermissible trade-off.
Regardless of the scope of the mother's moral obligation, her
ethical duty is incidental to the state's purported interest. The
policy's defense, both legal and moral, depends upon the weight of
the state's interest in the fetus' potential life being sufficient to
trump the declarant's right to autonomy125 The maternal-fetal re-
lationship may impose a greater moral duty upon the mother to
protect her endangered fetus, but the magnitude of the state's ob-
jective obligation to protect life must remain constant among those
owed its protection."2 That is, the state's purported interest in
protecting life may not vary by the relationship between the person
owed protection and the person denying aid. As the state's interest
in the particular fetus' life may only equal its interest in any other
individual in need of immediate rescue, its justification for inter-
vention is no greater when a fetus needs the pregnant declarant's
uterus than when a born child needs the hypothetical father's or-
gans, or when McFall needed his cousin's bone marrow. The state
122. See supra notes 42-44.
123. See Helene M. Cole, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy: Court-Ordered Medical
Treatments and Legal Penalties for Potentially Harmful Behavior by Pregnant Women,
264 LA.M.A. 2663, 2664 (1990) (recognizing a greater moral responsibility of a pregnant
woman to her fetus than that of one individual to another, but arguing against judicial
intervention when a woman has made an informed refusal of treatment); Nelson &
Milliken, supra note 120, at 1061 (acknowledging a mother's ethical obligation not to
harm her fetus).
124. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 30-31 and 81-84 and accompanying text.
126. Gradations in the state's interest in individuals' or groups of citizens' lives would
seem to violate the Equal Protection Clause. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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cannot claim its interest in protecting life justifies its treatment of
pregnant declarants.
Rather than strengthening the state's justification for interven-
tion, the close familial relation of the pregnant declarant to her
fetus arguably weakens the state's position both legally and moral-
ly. First, while the state is by no means prohibited from regulating
parental decisions, traditional legal doctrine regards the family unit
as sacred and only reluctantly grants states the right to interfere in
family decisions. 27 The decisions articulated in a living will often
incorporate the declarant's concern for the needs and suffering of
her family.' While society may justifiably impose upon a preg-
nant woman a greater moral duty to submit to treatment to save
her fetus than upon an individual without familial obligation, the
family's legal right to be left alone may render the state less justi-
fied in forcing her submission.
Second, the declarant, when competent, was the person most
directly responsible for the fetus' welfare, and, as reflected by the
deference accorded parental decisions, the most deserving of the
right to determine the child-to-be's best interests. Thus, even
if-especially if-the mother knew of her pregnancy when she
directed the withholding of life-sustaining treatment, the state ought
to recognize the moral cost of automatically disregarding her direc-
tive. As admitted by the Supreme Court, the creation of another
life may not be an immutable moral good; the Roe opinion recog-
nized the suffering of an unwanted child and "the problem of
bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically or
otherwise, to take care of it."' 29 Ohio's pregnancy clause advanc-
es the state's abstract interest in the fetus' potential life with no
consideration whatsoever of the life that fetus as a born child
might have. 3° Dispensing with the knowledge or opinions infused
127. See supra note 29.
128. See Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 636 (Mass. 1986)
(patients may execute living wills to ensure that they are not kept alive in a condition
they see as burdensome to their loved ones). See also MEISEL, supra note 3, § 10.2
(stating that the second general purpose of advance directives, following the patient's
desire to exercise control in health care decision making, is to guide and ease confusion
when others must make life and death decisions for the incompetent patient).
129. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973). See supra note 32 and accompanying
text.
130. In its policy analysis of a surrogate mother arrangement, the New Jersey Supreme
Court considered the "feared" effects of surrogate parenting arrangements, predominantly
"the impact on the child who learns her life was bought, that she is the offspring of
someone who gave birth to her only to obtain money." In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227,
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into the mother's living will may entail a significant moral cost.
The pregnancy clause's singular advancement of the state's
abstract interest in the fetus' life also ignores the costs continuing
treatment may impose on the declarant's family beyond the fetus.
While the reasons for her decision may remain unknown, a preg-
nant declarant's living will may reflect her view, implicitly or
expressly, that terminating treatment best served her family's inter-
ests.' It is not unlikely that the declarant, as a competent adult,
executed the living will solely out of concern for her family, rather
than her* own fear of suffering or perceived indignity in being
maintained artificially, for she may have anticipated her lack of
awareness of any experience whatsoever when her living will be-
came operative. Perhaps she believed that futile life-sustaining care
would devastate her family's financial"' and emotional resources,
preventing them from caring for themselves and for each other.
The mandate to disregard the pregnant declarant's directives ignores
the cost of whatever harms the declarant feared would befall her
family, which may include the fetus as a born child, by continuing
her treatment. As the pregnancy clause precludes consideration of
the complex moral obligations among all the parties involved, its
mandate to continue treating pregnant declarants against their wish-
es is unacceptable state policy.
1250 (NJ. 1988). Even in the best of outcomes in which the life of a pregnant
declarant's born child is not filled with hardships, the child's discovery of the circum-
stances of her birth seems equally harsh.
131. This reflection or motivation of the competent adult who executed the living will
seems to remain consistent, even if, as Dresser argues, see supra note 7, at 432-34, that
the competent patient's interest in controlling her future care through a living will trans-
forms when the patient becomes incompetent. No way exists of ascertaining whether the
value of an incompetent patient's current sensations outweighs the harm of contravening
her wish, as a competent person, not to burden her family with life-sustaining treatment
once she became incompetent. However, her living will may evince the declarant's prima-
ry concern for the impact continuing treatment would have on her family, and ought not
to be disregarded.
132. The issue of cost beyond the family raises other problems with the pregnancy
clause's narrow focus. While the benefit of saving the fetus may offset the cost of treat-
ment, the state abdicated its responsibility if it failed to consider the costs to society of
mandating expensive life-sustaining care for pregnant declarants. Furthermore, it seems
hypocritical to condone the allocation of money in this context when the state does not
guarantee 'every woman adequate prenatal care, nor every born child, to whom the state
owes arguably greater protection than fetuses, adequate health care. See Murray, Prenatal
Drug Exposure, supra note 58, at 107 (alleging that the nation's "patchwork system of
health care, which results in many women not getting adequate prenatal care, may cause
more damage to more children than any illegal drug").
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V. CONCLUSION
The moral flaw in Ohio's policy toward pregnant declarants
arises not from its recognition of the state's interest in protecting
the potential life of the fetus. Rather, the flaw lies in its singular
promotion of the state's abstract interest in potential life to the
exclusion of all other moral considerations. Foremost is the moral
cost of mandating treatment for the pregnant declarant as the
means toward that end. The disregard for her advance directives
derogates her rights of self-determination and bodily integrity in a
deeply personal and self-defining decision. Treating the duty owed
by mother to fetus as the only morally important one, the policy
ignores responsibilities the declarant may have beyond the fetus.
Her obligations to herself, her family and friends, as may have
influenced her advance directives regarding her demise, should not
be automatically sacrificed. The state cannot justify the unprece-
dented physical intrusion in any other context; only the declarant's
family and caregivers ought to determine whether it should it be
here. Their judgments regarding the propriety of terminating treat-
ment, in light of their knowledge of the declarant's awareness of
her pregnancy prior to her incompetence,'33 her views regarding
the moral standing of her fetus, and all parties' views regarding the
best interests of the child if the pregnancy continued to full term,
are among worthy considerations.
Living wills offer individuals the opportunity to define the
meaning of their respective existences on this earth, and the cir-
cumstances which extinguish. that meaning. Ohio's living will law
deprives pregnant declarants of their rights to self-determination
and bodily integrity, and of their interests in protecting what and
who is most important to them, at exactly the point in time when
those values are infinite. "At the heart of liberty is the right to
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe,
133. While articulating comprehensive and specific guidelines for terminating a pregnant
declarant's medical treatment is beyond the scope of this Comment, the living will law
inarguably ought to require a competent female adult with a valid living will to reevaluate
her directives once she becomes aware of her pregnancy, and ought to require all women
with childbearing capacity who execute a living will to include specific treatment direc-
tives in the case of pregnancy.
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and of the mystery of human life. '' "M The state of Ohio should
not deprive pregnant women of that liberty.
ANNE D. LEDERMAN
134. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2807 (1992).
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